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Abstract 
Hua-wang Qin et al. proposed a novel threshold signature scheme based on the general access structure in order to 
break the applied limitation of the conventional threshold signature schemes. The security of the scheme was 
analyzed in this paper, and it is pointed out that the scheme is insecure because it cannot withstand conspiracy attacks 
and what’s more, the identity of signer cannot be investigated. To overcome these security vulnerabilities, this paper 
proposed an improved threshold signature scheme, and the security analysis results show that the improved scheme 
can not only resist the conspiracy attack, but also have the properties of anonymity and traceability simultaneously. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the threshold signature scheme was firstly introduced by Desmedt and Frankel, and they 
proposed the first (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on RSA cryptosystem [1] in 1991. In the (t, n)
threshold signature scheme, a signature can be generated when the number of participators is equal to or 
more than the threshold value t, but any less than t players cannot generate a valid one. A secure threshold 
signature scheme should not only satisfy the properties including threshold characteristics, traceability, 
anonymity and robustness, but also can withstand the conspiracy attack and the forgery attack. The 
threshold signature schemes have been discussed widely and many threshold signature schemes [3-8] 
have been proposed, but no scheme meets all of those properties.  
In many practical applications, the signing power of the signature players is differentiated according to 
the importance of the message which needs to be signed. Some important message must to be signed by 
several players and some others by less players even one. In this case, the conventional (t, n) threshold 
signature scheme is helpless. So the scholars proposed changeable threshold signature schemes [2, 3] and 
threshold signature schemes with privilege subsets [9] to this problem. But all of those schemes cannot be 
used to solve the situation [10] put forward by Hua-wang Qin et al. It is that the power of signing belongs 
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to some specified subsets, and the group of any t or more players has no right to sign if the subset they 
formed is not a specified subset. 
 Hua-wang Qin et al. referenced the secret sharing scheme with general access structures and proposed a 
novel threshold signature scheme [10] based on the general access structure for this problem. Their 
scheme has a wide range of applications and the players just need to preserve and maintain a few private 
keys. Unfortunately, according to our security analysis, their scheme cannot resist the player’s conspiracy 
attack. And moreover, the signers cannot be traced when a dispute on the signature arises. To overcome 
these security weaknesses, we propose an improved scheme and the security analysis result shows that the 
improved scheme can not only resist the conspiracy attack, but also have the properties of anonymity and 
traceability simultaneously. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review Qin et al.’s threshold signature 
scheme based on the general access structure and analyze its weaknesses. In Section III, we present an 
improved threshold signature scheme. In Section IV, we prove the correctness of the improved scheme 
and analyze it. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section V. 
2. Review of the Qin et al.'s scheme and its weaknesses 
In this section, we review Qin et al.’s threshold signature scheme and then present the weaknesses of their 
scheme.  
A. Initialization phase 
The system parameters are defined as follows: n players are denoted by U1, U2, … , Un and let Γ0 be the 
minimal access structure set of the signature system. Γ0 contains α authorized subsets and be defined 
byΓ0= {Pi |i=1, 2,…, α}.
  1) The Key Distribution Center (KDC) chooses two large prime numbers p and q, such that q | (p -1). 
Then let g be an element of order q in GF (p) and p, q, g are opened. 
  2) The KDC selects randomly an integer X and divides X into n different sub-secrets, such that X = 
x1+x2+…+xn and xj(j=1, 2,…, n) must be an integer. Afterwards, KDC sends xj secretly to the 
corresponding player Uj by using a secure channel. 
  3) For each authorized subset Pi (i= 1, 2,…, α), KDC computes and broadcasts .=iG ∑− jxX
  4) Each player Uj (j=1, 2,…, n) selects randomly an integer kj over [1, p -1] and computes and broadcasts 
， .pgy jjkrj mod= =jr pg jk mod
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B.  Generation of partial signature and verification 
  1) Assume that the authorized subset Pi want to sign a message m. Each player Uj belongs to Pi chooses 
randomly an integer tj over [1, p -1] and computes and broadcasts and .
2) Uj computes .  3) Uj computes the partial signature: , and 
sends it to the Designated Clerk (DC). And h() is a secure one-way hash function. 4) The DC confirms the 
validity of Sj by checking if the equation  holds.  
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C. Generation of threshold signature and verification 
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  1) If all Sj is valid, the DC computes , and the threshold signature on m is {m, S, Z, R, E}.  
2) Any verifier can verify the validity of the threshold signature {m, S, Z, R, E} by checking if the 
equation holds.  
),( mZhGSS j
PU
j
ij
+= ∑
∈
pERZg mZhZS mod)( ),(1−=
D. The weaknesses of Qin et al.’s scheme 
  1) The Qin et al.’s scheme cannot resist the conspiracy attack 
In Qin et al.’s scheme, all players of any an authorized subset Pi in the minimal access structure set Γ0 can 
cooperate to compute the system secret key. Then, they conspirators can sign any message they like 
without taking responsibility. The reasons are as follows. The system secret key X is computed as follow: 
X = x1+x2+…+xn, where xj is the player’s secret key. The players in the authorized subset Pi can show 
their secret key to each conspirator, and they just need to figure out the rest ∑ ∈− PU jj xX . Unfortunately, the 
rest part can be fond directly from the public information, that’s the Gi. Now they get the X= . ∑ ∈+ PU ji xG j
  Afterwards, conspirators can sign any message. The right of the threshold signature verification equation 
can be rewrite like this: 
. X is known and they can select a random number instead of Z
because Z contains random number tj. Assume conspirators take a random number v as , then Z is 
replaced by 
==
−− ),(1),(1 )()( mZhxmZh RRgER
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Z . So, the threshold signature is pmodg v
 and {m, S’, Z’, R, E}. Check the new threshold signature using the verification 
equation. Left is  
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Obviously, it’s equal to the right and the equation holds. So, this attack works. 
  2) The signers in Qin et al.’s scheme are untraceable 
Traceability is the main security notion of the threshold signature, since it is related to unforgeability: 
nobody (even a collusion of players) should be able to produce a valid signature that cannot be open in a 
convincing way. Lack of traceability makes the Qin et al.’s scheme useless.  
In Qin et al.’s scheme, the parameters which can be used to trace the signers are the players’ private key xj
and the random number kj chose by player Uj in the initialization phase. The last valid threshold signature 
is {m, S, Z, R, E}, where m, R, E have no relation to do with the signers. Though kj-1 is needed when we 
compute Z, we cannot calculated kj or any information about kj from Z because it contains another random 
number tj. So we cannot trace the signers by using Z. According to the discussion above, all players of 
any an authorized subset Pi can cooperate to compute the system secret key and forge a valid threshold 
signature. Obviously, we also cannot trace the signers from S. In addition, the DC’s responsibility in this 
scheme is just synthesizing the threshold signature, and anyone who got the partial signatures can do it. 
As a result, the Qin et al.’s scheme has no the property of traceability, which means that we cannot trace 
adversarial signers if forgery is suspected.  
  Therefore, Qin et al.’s scheme is insecure. 
3. AN IMPROVED THRESHOLD SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON THE GENERAL ACCESS STRUCTURE
To overcome the weaknesses of Qin et al.’s scheme, we propose an improved scheme in this section. 
A. Initialization phase 
 1) The KDC selects two large prime numbers p and q, such that q | (p -1). Then let g be an element of 
order q in GF (p) and p, q, g are opened. The KDC chooses and broadcasts a secure one-way hash 
function h ().   2) The KDC selects randomly an integer X and divides X into n different sub-secrets, such 
that X = x1+x2+…+xn and xj(j=1, 2,…, n) must be an integer. Afterwards, KDC sends xj secretly to the 
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corresponding player Uj by using a secure channel. Then KDC computes and broadcasts ,   
the public key, and (j=1, 2,…, n).  3) For each authorized subset Pi (i= 1, 2,…, α), 
KDC computes as follows: KDC chooses a random integer si in the range [1, p-1] and computes 
. Next, he calculated Ai in accordance with the congruence equation .
Finally, KDC opens each (Ri, Ai).  4) The player Uj accepts xj from KDC if the equation 
holds. 
modXY g p=
qARsx iiij mod+=
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B. Generation of partial signature and verification 
  1) Assume that the authorized subset Pi want to sign a message m. Each player Uj belongs to Pi chooses 
randomly an integer kj in the range [1, p -1] and computes and broadcasts .=jK pg jk mod
  2) After receiving all Kj, each player Uj computes =K .
pK mod∏
ic PU ∈
  3) Each player Uj generates his partial signature on message m: (1) 
c
                                                                                                         
(1) qKkmKhxS jjj mod]),([ −=
And Uj sends it to the DC.  
4) The DC verifies the partial signature by checking the equation:  
                                                                                                               
(2) pygK mKhjSKj j mod)( ),(=
If it holds, DC accepts. Otherwise, DC asks the player to re-compute the partial signature. 
C. Generation of the threshold signature and verification 
  1) If all partial signatures are valid, the DC chooses the corresponding (Ri, Ai) and selects a random 
integer l in the range [1, p-1]. Let . Then DC generates the threshold signature:  pgRR lmKhRi i mod
),(
=
qlmKhASS i
PU
j
ij
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∈
                                                 
(3) 
And {m, S, K, R} is the final threshold signature on the message m.
  2) Any verifier can verify the validity of the threshold signature {m, S, K, R} by checking the following 
equation:  
pYRKg mKhKS mod)( ),(≡                                                        
(4) 
If it holds, the verifier accepts the signature, otherwise it’s rejected. 
D. Anonymity and traceability of the improved scheme 
Given two sets of honest players P1 and P2, the adversary should not have any significant advantage in 
guessing which one of them have issued a valid signature. Surely, the improved scheme has the 
anonymity property. The verifier can check the valid of the threshold signature {m, S, K, R} and cannot 
reveal any useful information about the secret key or the signers. Because K is a random number and S
and R are parameters contain random numbers, they are useless for identifying the signers. So the 
improved scheme provides anonymous.  
When there is a dispute on a signature, the KDC can trace the signers who participated in making the 
threshold signature. (1) If DC acts in concert with KDC, then DC shows the random integer l which he 
used in the phase of generation of threshold signature to KDC when the KDC asked. The KDC 
computes , which is equal to . Because all (Ri, Ai) are 
generated by KDC, he knows the relationship between (Ri, Ai) and the authorized subset Pi. And KDC can 
computes for i= 1, 2,…,α. The (Ri, Ai) makes ri’ equal to r is the right one and the 
corresponding authorized subset is the signers’ set signed the message. (2) If DC doesn’t act in concert 
pgRr l mod−⋅=
Rr mKhRii i mod
),('
=
pRr mKhRi i mod
),(
=
p
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with KDC, then KDC need to compute , obviously, it’s equal to 
. Then KDC can compute the value r which is mentioned earlier 
and . Now the remaining steps is described in part one. So the KDC can trace the 
signers.Therefore, the improved threshold scheme satisfies the properties of the signers' anonymity and 
traceability．
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4. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED SCHEME
The correctness and security of the improved scheme will be discussed in this section. 
A. Correctness 
  1) If , then Sj is the valid partial signature produced by Uj.
Proof:
p
pj
mod
mod  
  2) If , then {m, S, K, R} is the valid threshold signature of m.
Proof:
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Therefore, the threshold signature {m, S, K, R} can be verified. 
B. Security analysis of the improved scheme 
1) The adversary cannot forge a valid partial signature satisfying Eq. 2. 
Suppose an attacker tries to imitate a player Ui and generate a legitimate partial signature. According to 
the Eq. 1, the attacker needs to get the player’s secret key xi. However, solving xi from the public 
information is more difficult than solving discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Even if the attacker got a 
valid partial signature, he cannot get xi because there are two unknown parameters xi and ki in Eq. 1. 
Moreover, parameter substitution attack is useless for this scheme because of the secure one-way hash 
function h (). So the adversary cannot forge a valid partial signature satisfying Eq. 2. 
  2) The adversary cannot forge a valid threshold signature of message m satisfying Eq. 4.  
Suppose an attacker tries to forge a valid threshold signature, then the forged signature needs to make the 
Eq. 4 hold, which means that attacker got all players private keys of at least one authorized subset. We 
know that it is impossible. Another way is getting the secret key X, but it’s also impossible because the 
attacker cannot get the players’ private keys and (Ri, Ai) is useless because of the lack of si. From the Eq.3 
and 4, the improved scheme is secure against substitution attacks under the DLP and one-way hash 
function assumptions．So this attack cannot work successfully.
3) No matter how many players are in collusion, they cannot cooperate to release non-conspirator’s 
private keys, let alone the group’s secret key.  
To against the conspiracy attack, the KDC doesn’t broadcast the =iG ∑ ∈− PU jj xX , computes (Ri, Ai) for 
each authorized subset as a substitute and ∑ ∈PU ji −= xXG j
. Then the conspirators cannot get the 
secret key X because si is a secret kept by KDC. As the KDC divided the X into n pieces randomly, 
qARs iii mod+=
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nobody can deduce a non-conspirator’s private key no matter how much keys he knows from other 
conspirators. So the players’ private keys cannot be released by the conspirators from the public 
information. As a result, in the improved scheme, the conspirators cannot get more useful information 
then a player does. Therefore the improved scheme withstands conspiracy attack and overcomes the 
weakness in the previously Qin et al.’s scheme. 
5. CONCLUSION
The purpose of proposed threshold signature scheme based on the general access structure is breaking the 
applied limitation of the conventional threshold signature schemes based on the general access structure. 
In this paper, we pointed out the security weakness of the Qin et al.'s threshold signature scheme. 
Furthermore, we proposed an improved scheme which overcomes its weakness. And the security analysis 
result shows that the improved scheme can withstand the conspiracy attack and has the properties of the 
signers' anonymity and traceability．It is still an interesting problem to develop or analyze threshold 
signature schemes based on the General Access Structure. 
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